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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






NANCY L. SMITH, 




N3 OCEANIC, INC. 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-16-cv-00730) 
District Judge: Honorable Berle M. Schiller 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 27, 2017 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges. 
 






RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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 Nancy Smith appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to N3 
Oceanic, Inc., her former employer, in her suit for age discrimination and retaliation 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”).  We will affirm. 
I 
 As we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we set out only the facts necessary 
for the discussion that follows.1  From February 2004 until September 2014, Smith was 
employed by N3 Oceanic, Inc. as a Customer Service Representative (“CSR”). App. 192.  
During her 10-year-long tenure with the company, N3’s management regarded Smith as a 
good employee with some recurring issues related to her demeanor.  App. 334.  Emails 
among N3’s management document incidents when Smith reacted unprofessionally to 
instructions or events, describing her as “argumentative,” “disagreeable,” and “angry.”  
App. 382, 384.  At the time of her firing, Smith was 70 years old, the oldest CSR 
employed by N3.  App. 334.   
Several months before her termination, N3 changed its employee health benefits to 
an age-based policy, such that healthcare premiums paid by employees would correlate 
with the employee’s age.2  App. 337.  In August 2014, because of the increase in costs, 
Smith waived her health benefits, writing “cannot afford – discrimination!” on the waiver 
                                              
1 For the purpose of this appeal, the facts described are undisputed or viewed in 
the light most favorable to Smith. 
 
2 N3 changed from a four-tier health insurance policy in which the tiers were 
determined by the number of people insured (self, self plus spouse, self plus children, 
etc.) and all employees paid the same amount for each tier regardless of age, to an age-
based policy in which the employee’s premiums were determined by the employee’s age 
at the time the policy came into effect.  App 337. 
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form.  App. 370.  N3’s management was aware of Smith’s comments on the form.  App. 
337. 
On September 6, 2014, N3 received an email from a disgruntled customer with the 
subject line “My last purchase with [N3]” complaining of misleading and inconsistent 
promotional pricing.  App. 200.  He noted in the email that the CSRs shared his 
frustration but had told him that their concerns “f[ell] on deaf ears with management.”  
Id.  N3 then traced the customer’s last order in its ordering database and found that Smith 
had handled the order.  App. 310.  Although N3 was unable to prove that Smith had 
made the disparaging remarks about management to the customer, Smith’s supervisor 
believed that they were consistent with comments that Smith had previously made about 
pricing and promotions.  App. 247-48.  Over the course of the next week, N3 hired an 
18-year-old woman as a CSR and fired Smith.  App. 197, 245. 
 In her complaint against N3, Smith alleged a violation of the ADEA based on age 
discrimination and retaliation for protected conduct.  The District Court granted N3 
summary judgment on both of Smith’s claims.  This timely appeal followed.  We will 
address each claim in turn. 
II3 
                                              
3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. 
§ 621.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our standard of review of a 
grant of summary judgment is plenary.  NAACP v. City of Phila., 834 F.3d 435, 440 (3d 
Cir. 2016).  We apply the same summary judgment standard as the District Court.  See 
Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 2015).  That standard 
required the Court to grant summary judgment where, with inferences drawn in favor of 
the non-moving party, “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
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 The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s age.”  29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).  In assessing a 
claim of age discrimination under the ADEA, courts employ the McDonnell Douglas 
burden-shifting framework.  Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n. of Se. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 
667-68 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 
(1973)).  A plaintiff alleging employment discrimination under the ADEA must make a 
prima facie case with four elements: (1) she is over 40 years old; (2) she is qualified for 
the position; (3) she suffered from an adverse employment decision; and (4) her 
replacement was sufficiently younger to permit a reasonable inference of age 
discrimination.  Potence v. Hazleton Area Sch. Dist., 357 F.3d 366, 370 (3d Cir. 2004).  
Under the burden-shifting framework, once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the 
burden shifts to the employer to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” 
for the adverse action.  McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.  If the employer 
demonstrates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the burden shifts back to the 
plaintiff to show that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.  Willis v. UPMC 
Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 644-45 (3d Cir. 2015).   
 The District Court found that Smith made a prima facie case and that N3 
articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the firing by citing the customer 
complaint and Smith’s occasional lack of professionalism.   Neither of these findings is 
                                                                                                                                                  
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Id. at 218; see 
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
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disputed by the parties.  The District Court granted summary judgment to N3 after 
conluding that she had failed to show that N3’s reasons were pretextual.  Smith 
challenges this conclusion on appeal.  
The third and final step of the McDonnell Douglas framework requires the 
plaintiff to demonstrate that the presumptively valid reasons for her rejection dissembled 
a discriminatory decision.  McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 805.  Plaintiff must point to some 
evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) 
disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious 
discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the 
employer’s actions.  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994).  “[S]ince the 
factual dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer,” not 
whether the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, the plaintiff must “demonstrate 
such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the 
employer’s proffered legitimate reasons that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find 
them ‘unworthy of credence.’”  Id. at 765 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).   
Smith fails to offer evidence which would cast doubt on N3’s articulated reasons 
or suggest N3’s decision was motivated by “discriminatory animus.”  Id.  Smith contends 
that N3 neither formally disciplined her for unprofessional conduct nor identified specific 
examples of such conduct.  Neither of these arguments, however, address the incidents 
documented in N3’s internal emails over the course of Smith’s employment.  Similarly, 
while Smith denies making critical remarks about N3’s management to customers, it was 
reasonable for N3 to conclude based on Smith’s past comments and the customer’s order 
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history that she made the statement alleged in the email.  Because she is unable to show 
that N3’s legitimate reasons were pretextual, Smith’s discrimination claim must fail.   
III 
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff asserting a retaliation claim 
under the ADEA must establish a prima facie case by showing: (1) she was engaged in 
protected activities; (2) the employer took an adverse employment action after or 
contemporaneous with the employee’s protected activity; and (3) a causal link exists 
between the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s adverse action.  Krouse v. 
Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997).  Protected activities include not 
only an employee’s filing of formal charges of discrimination against an employer but 
also “informal protests of discriminatory employment practices, including making 
complaints to management.”  Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 
2015) (quoting Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 
135 (3d Cir. 2006)).  If the plaintiff makes these showings, the burden of production 
shifts to the employer to present a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for having taken the 
adverse action.  Id. (citation omitted). “If the employer advances such a reason, the 
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that ‘the employer’s proffered 
explanation was false, and that retaliation was the real reason for the adverse employment 





Smith established a prima facie case. First, her comment (“cannot afford-
discrimination!”) on her waiver form qualifies as a protected activity.  Given the increase 
in health premiums because of her age, a jury could reasonably conclude that Smith 
intended her comments to be an “informal protest” expressing to management her belief 
that she had suffered discrimination on the basis of her age.  Id.  Her supervisor testified 
that “there were conversations . . . about what [the comment] meant.”  App. 337.  As to 
the second element, Smith’s termination of employment qualifies as an adverse 
employment action. Lastly, a jury could reasonably conclude that the timing of the 
termination, approximately one month after she submitted the waiver form, in light of 
Smith’s unblemished formal disciplinary record, satisfies the third element in establishing 
a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action. 
N3, however, presented a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action 
by once more citing the customer complaint and Smith’s history of unprofessional 
behavior.  As discussed in greater detail above, Smith failed to rebut N3’s claim that it 
fired her because she disparaged N3’s management to a customer, which served as the 
culmination of a documented history of occasionally unprofessional behavior.  Thus, 
Smith’s retaliation claim must fail. 
IV 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment to N3.  
